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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO, DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH AND WELFARE

Supreme Ct. Docket #39766-2012

Plaintiff,
Vs.
AMY B. SLANE,
Defendant-Petitioner-Respondent,
vs.
STEPHEN WAYNE ADAMS,
Defendant-Respondent-Appellant.

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.
Honorable Kathryn A. Sticklen, presiding.

James M. Runsvold, Pro Bono Attorney for Appellant
P.O. Box 917
Caldwell, Idaho 83606-0917
ISB #2975
Thomas B. Dominick, Attorney for Respondent
500 W. Bannock
Boise, Idaho 83702
ISB #2908
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COMES NOW Appellant Stephen W. Adams aka Steven (sic) Wayne Adams (Stephen)
by and through his attorney of record James M. Runsvold and, pursuant to IAR Rule 35,
presents his reply brief as follows:
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ARGUMENT
I. AMY'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE IS INACCURATE IN SOME RESPECTS.

Amy quotes from the magistrate's judgment of conviction R., p. 344 but leaves out
language needed to understand the magistrate's actual finding. The missing language is "one
count of contempt was alleged, however." Id., R., p. 345. Since Amy had only alleged one count
of contempt, the magistrate could not have actually found Stephen in contempt for April, May,
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July, August, September, and December of2009 and January of2012, despite what the
magistrate stated in his judgment of conviction.
Whereas the magistrate referred to the $5715.00 as the "contempt amount", R., pp. 35354, a point emphasized in Amy's brief, the contempt amount was actually $635, Stephen's child
support obligation for the month of November, 2009. The greater amount is for nine months of
child support. Since Amy had only pled one count of contempt, R., pp. 46-59, the magistrate
could only properly find Stephen guilty on one count of contempt, i.e., for failure to pay one
month's support.
II. AMY HAS NOT ADDRESSED KEY ARGUMENTS MADE BY STEPHEN.
Amy inexplicably does not respond at all to various arguments made by Stephen in his
Appellant's Brief, including:
1. Stephen's Verified Motion to Modify Filiation Order is in reality a motion to establish for the
first time his custody/visitation rights since those have never before been addressed by any
court. In other words, it cannot be a motion to modify custody/visitation order because there
never has been a custody order entered regarding this child. Amy thus has not shown how the
import of Moffett v. Moffett, 151 Idaho 90, 96, 253 P.3d 764, 770 (Ct. App. 2011), which states,
"We decline to apply the 'no modification while in contempt rule' outside the true modification
context," can be avoided.
2. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 75 makes clear that a criminal contempt, as here, cannot
be purged, be definition. Amy has not shown how the "no modification while in contempt rule"
can be avoided by "purging" an unpurgeable criminal contempt.
3. Rodriguez v. Rodriguez, 150 Idaho 614, 249 P.3d 413 (Ct. App. 2011) actually upholds the
District Court acting as an intermediate appellate court in upholding the District Court's reversal
of the magistrate.
4. That Rodriguez is poorly reasoned and simply makes an out-of-the-blue pronouncement,
extending the "no modification while in contempt rule" from child support issues to child
custody/visitation issues, without any reconciliation with the "paramount" consideration of "best
interests of the child."
5. That Rodriguez, if not overruled or limited, will have dire unintended consequences including
children being left in wholly unsuitable circumstances just because one month of child support
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was not paid; and by using one willfully-denied visitation as a ground to deny a much-needed
child support modification.
6. That the benefits to the child of joint legal custody, which is (almost) always presumed to be
in the best interest of the child, has been summarily denied to this child by dismissal of
Stephen's motion to establish custody/visitation.
7. That the penalties for contempt are limited to those prescribed by statute and do not include
summary dismissal of pleadings.
8. That any order giving a criminal contemnor an opportunity to "purge" his or her contempt is in
reality a condition of probation, as recognized in Johnson v. Howard, 150 Idaho 330, 332, 246
P.3d 983, 985, n.2 (2011).
III. INABILITY TO PURGE AT SENTENCING NEGATES THE GROUNDS FOR THIS
SANCTION.
Neither party has appealed any finding of fact made by the magistrate. Thus the
magistrate's factual finding that Stephen is "unable to purge his contempt. .. before his
sentencing for his contempt", Amended Order (etc.), R., p. 354, has not been challenged.
However, there has never been a finding that "it was possible for him to do so", Resp. Brief, p.5,
at the relevant time, that is at the time of sentencing. The closest the magistrate came to saying
that is, "such inability [to purge his contempt] has not been shown to be for reasons beyond his
control, such as incarceration". Amended Order (etc), R., p. 354.
As with the contemnor in Rodriguez, the magistrate here did not conduct a hearing to
determine whether or not Stephen's admitted inability to pay was for reasons beyond his
control. Stephen had no opportunity to present his case on that issue.
The problem with Amy's analysis as to ability to purge, or not, and whether the inability
was for reasons beyond Stephen's control, or not, is that it conflates purging the contempt and
committing the contempt. The purging analysis comes into play only with regard to a civil
contempt where an element is a present ability to perform that which has been ordered, that is,
an ability to perform that which has been ordered at the time of sentencing. As noted even in
Nab, it would be futile to jail someone until they paid if they have no ability to pay at that time.
There the coercive nature of a civil contempt would not produce the desired compliance (Le.,
purging), but rather a never-ending term in jail.
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On the other hand, ability to pay at the time of the failure to do so is an element of
criminal contempt. If the alleged contemnor could have performed on time and in full when he
was ordered to do so, e.g., paid his November child support in full on or before November 1, but
simply chose not to, he is in criminal contempt. That is what Stephen did according to the
factual finding implicit at least in the magistrate's finding that he is criminal contempt. Stephen
cannot make that finding go away by anything he does now or could have done at sentencing.
He cannot "purge" the contempt by paying the contempt amount now or before sentencing.
Therefore, his ability, or not, to pay the contempt amount at the time of sentencing and whether,
or not, such inability would be excused under Nab as due to reasons beyond his control, is
irrelevant to whether or not Stephen is in criminal contempt. He has not appealed the
magistrate's finding that he is, and has accepted his sentence for the contempt. He appeals only
to challenge the magistrate's dismissal of his attempts to gain custody/visitation rights and both
coincidentally and separately to get his child support obligation lowered.
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED ON STEPHEN'S APPEAL TO
THE DISTRICT COURT.
The District Court has now entered its judgment against Stephen for attorney fees on his
intermediate appeal, $3245.00. Judgment for Attorney Fees on Appeal, October 16,2012,
augmented record. The fees were awarded on authority of IRCP Rule 75(m), R, p. 426. This
was done even though Stephen had not appealed the magistrate's findings of fact and
conclusions of law relating directly to the criminal contempt, only the dismissal of his claims, R,
p. 385, "Issues Presented on Appeal"; and Amy had not sought an award of attorney fees under
the contempt rule, Rule 75(m), but only under "Idaho Code Section 12-121, IAR 41, and IRCP
Rule 54(e), because this appeal is pursued frivolously, unreasonably or without foundation," R,
p. 398. The District Court has not of course made a finding that Stephen's intermediate appeal
was "pursued frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation", and therefore fees could not
have been awarded on the grounds asserted by Amy.
V. ATTORNEY'S FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED AGASINT EITHER PARTY ON THIS
APPEAL.
Amy argues that attorney fees should be awarded against Stephen under the contempt
rule, IRCP Rule 75(m). For the reason that Stephen is not appealing his conviction of criminal
contempt, attorney fees should not be awarded against him under the contempt rule.
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Amy asserts that even if the contempt rule does not allow an award of attorney fees
against Stephen, alternate grounds do, namely Idaho Code Section 12-121. However, Stephen
has presented reasonable arguments in support of his position, in an area of law which is far
from settled. Attorney fees should not be awarded against Stephen even if he does not prevail
on this appeal where he has reasonably argued, even if unsuccessfully, for an extension of
Idaho law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244,249,985 P.2d 669, 674 (1999).
Stephen does not seek an award of attorney fees against Amy.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in Appellant's Brief, the decisions of the magistrate and of the
District Court on the intermediate appeal should be reversed and the matter remanded for trial
of Stephen's motions on the merits.
The District Court's award of attorney fees against Stephen should be vacated, since he
has not appealed his contempt conviction, and has not appealed "frivolously, unreasonably, or
without foundation."
Inter alia for the same reasons, attorney fees should not be awarded against him on his
appeal to the Supreme Court.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this __ day of

,2012.

James M. Runsvold

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Attorney for Respondent Amy Slane
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